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Abstract
This paper addresses the issue of truth and knowledge in management
generally and knowledge management in particular. Based on ideas from
critical realism and critical theory, it argues against the monovalent
conceptualization of knowledge implicitly or explicitly held by many authors
and aims instead to develop a characterization that recognizes the rich and
varied ways in which human beings may be said ‘to know’. It points out and
conceptualizes a fundamental dimension of knowledge that is generally
ignored or cursorily treated within the literature, that is, ‘truth’. It identifies
four forms of knowledge – propositional, experiential, performative and
epistemological – and explores their characteristics, especially in terms of truth
and validity. It points out some implications for knowledge management.
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Introduction
Although knowledge management (KM) has established itself as a bona fide
subject both in practice (Grover & Davenport, 2001) and in the academic
world (Schultze & Leidner, 2002), there has been, and remains, consider-
able debate about the fundamental concepts of ‘knowledge’, ‘information’
and even of ‘data’. In some ways this should not surprise us as the same
thing may be said at the level of management research as a whole.
Management as a discipline has the aim of generating valid knowledge but
has been schizophrenic as to how this should be achieved at least since the
time of Burrell & Morgan’s (1979) Sociological Paradigms and Organizational
Analysis. Different paradigms or, as Deetz (1996) terms them, discourses
make radically different assumptions in terms of ontology, epistemology
and methodology, thus generating competing views as to what might be
taken as knowledge. It has become commonplace to identify at least four
such discourses – positivism (empiricism), interpretivism (construction-
ism), critical and postmodern (Jackson, 2000, 2005).
It can be argued that the stand-off between positivism and interpreti-
vism has been ameliorated (Mingers, 2004a) in favour of some form of
pluralism, either one that simply accepts the validity of different
paradigms (e.g., Robey, 1996; Jackson, 2000) or one that seeks actively
to combine research approaches (e.g., Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998;
Goles & Hirschheim, 2000; Mingers, 2001a). However, where does this
leave the question of knowledge? Are there different forms of knowledge
depending on the paradigm in use? And how does this relate to truth,
which is supposedly an essential characteristic of knowledge as opposed to
mere belief?
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This paper will address these issues from a particular
perspective, that of critical realism (CR) as developed
primarily by Bhaskar (Bhaskar, 1978, 1979; Archer et al.,
1998).1 This philosophy accepts aspects of both positi-
vism and interpretivism but maintains a strongly realist
and critical core. We will contextualize the argument by
considering a recent debate between Meckler & Baillie
(M&B) (2003a, b) and Gioia (and others) (Gioia, 2003;
Lounsbury, 2003; Ryan, 2005), and particularly a re-
sponse by Hunt (2005). M&B proposed a ‘middle way’
between strong positivism and strong constructionism
based, in part, on a form of correspondence theory and
Searle’s (1996) set of distinctions between epistemic and
ontological objectivity and subjectivity. Gioia strongly
attacked this as simply a way of assimilating interpreti-
vism to positivism. Hunt essentially backed M&B by
arguing the case for scientific realism (as distinct from CR
mentioned above) and a particular conception of truth
intimately related to trust.
The argument of this paper is in broad agreement with
Hunt except that I would wish to maintain a more
polyvalent view of truth, and therefore knowledge. Put
simply, I accept the ontological claims of realism for the
existence of a subject-independent and causally effica-
cious world. But, I argue, within this world there are
substantively different kinds of things that can be the
objects of knowledge to which we have different forms of
epistemological access. Thus, there is neither one kind of
knowledge nor one kind of truth.
The paper begins with a brief review of M&B’s debate
and particularly Hunt’s response. It then reviews concep-
tions of knowledge within KM and points out their
limitations, not least the lack of connection to truth. The
next section describes various theories of truth, focusing
on ideas from CR and the recent work of critical theorist
Ju¨rgen Habermas (2003). Following this, I show that there
are many ways in which we validly talk of ‘knowing’
something and identify some dimensions that underlie
all of them. One of these dimensions is that of truth or,
more generally, warrantability or justification. This is
essential in distinguishing knowledge from mere belief or
assertion. I then bring these threads together to present a
typology of four distinctively different forms of knowl-
edge, each with different possibilities of truth or
warrantability. Finally, I consider the implications of this
theory for both KM and management knowledge.
The realism debate
M&B (2003a) project was to develop a position in
between constructionism (or postmodernism as they
sometimes, perhaps incorrectly, called it) and positivism.
They wanted to maintain the notion of truth as a broad
correspondence between statement or beliefs about the
world and the way the world ‘actually is’ without
accepting some direct, positivistic, relation between
sentences and facts. Their main aim, and most of their
paper, was actually directed against what they took to be
the constructionist view (Astley, 1985) that there could
be no objective truth since the product of social research
was only ever further concepts and theories, never
statements that could be made true (or false) by some
external reference. Truth was always socially constructed.
M&B did accept that the world of social facts and events
was humanly constructed, but drew on Searle’s (1996)
work to argue that the social world was ontologically
subjective but still potentially epistemically objective.
Gioia (2003), in a vituperative response, sees it all as a
plot to assimilate constructionism back into the positivist
fold. The central disagreement can be described quite
simply. For M&B there is a reality of facts and events
(accepting the differences between physical and social)
and a humanly constructed world of beliefs and theories
that may be true or false in relation to that reality. Gioia
accepts that things do exist and events do occur, there are
indeed ‘facts’, but these in themselves are uninteresting
or perhaps irrelevant until they become part of the social
world through interpretation, discussion and debate. For
Gioia it is this world of belief and interpretation that is
real, not the facts in themselves. ‘The actions, events,
observations, and so forth might be common, but those
are mere data from which the interpreted world is
assembled. y The world we deal with is the interpreted
world, not the world rendered in objective facts’ (Gioia,
2003, p. 287, original italics).
Reality, or at least social reality, is only that which
results from peoples’ interpretations, and therefore
truth must be bound to that reality as well. It is either
the relative truth of different interpretations and valua-
tions, or, on occasions, ‘an intersubjectively agreed truth
arrived at by negotiated consensus’ (Gioia, 2003, p. 288).
I will discuss this later in terms of Habermas’s consensus
theory of truth.
Hunt (2005) is generally sympathetic to M&B’s argu-
ment but feels that their Tarskian theory of truth is
impoverished and so he presents a more sophisticated
version based on scientific realism (SR). For Hunt, SR is
based on four principles:(i) classical realism, which
maintains that the world exists independently of its
being perceived or represented; (ii) fallibilistic realism,
which accepts that knowledge can never be known with
certainty – it will always be fallible; (iii) Critical realism,2
which maintains that because of (ii) we must always
critically evaluate our theories; and (iv) inductive realism,
which holds that the long-run success of a theory does
provide evidence that something like that described in
the theory must be the case.1Although we are mainly interested in Bhaskar’s philosophy of
science, CR is becoming influential in organization theory
(Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000; Fleetwood & Ackroyd, 2004),
sociology (Archer, 1995; Brown et al., 2002; Danermark et al.,
2002) and economics (Lawson, 1997).
2‘Critical realism’ as mentioned here is not the same as
Bhaskar’s CR to be discussed later in the paper.
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From this Hunt develops a ‘model’ (not really a
definition) to explain what we might mean by saying
‘Theory X is likely to be true’ (because of (ii) above we
cannot be certain that Theory X is true). The model
presumes some theory (containing entities, attributes
and structures) about the world. The theory has certain
implications such as explanations or predictions that can
be compared with the external world. These comparisons
will result in successes or failures that reflect back on the
theory. It is also recognized that the theory (or rather its
implications) may have direct effects on the world
through changing peoples’ beliefs and behaviours. It is,
then, the relative proportion of successes and failures that
gives us cause to believe or not believe in the theory. The
greater the proportion of successes, the more likely it is
that something similar to the theory must actually exist.
Hunt then connects this idea to trust through the work
of Harre´ (1986), who argued that, since we could never
know for certain, in practice communities of scientists
relied on trust. Rather than certain knowledge they trade
in trustworthy knowledge that which they accepted is
genuinely believed, for good reasons, by their colleagues.
For Hunt, this means that it is imperative that
valid knowledge should have some grounding in the
external world rather than being wholly internal to a
particular discourse.
The argument that I wish to put forward is that both
M&B and Hunt have a singular or monovalent view of
truth and knowledge. That is, that there is only one type
of truth – some weak form of correspondence between
theories or beliefs and an external world; that there is
only one way of evaluating truth; and that there is,
therefore, only one form of knowledge assuming that
truth is an essential attribute of knowledge. In contrast, I
suggest that there are several quite distinct forms of
knowledge and correspondingly different ways in which
truth claims may be redeemed and different ways in
which knowledge may be generated (van der Walt, 2006).
Knowledge management
The discussion so far has been at the level of management
knowledge in general, that is, the knowledge produced by
management research, but to focus the debate I want to
discuss one particular area of management, that of KM.
This is an interesting domain to consider for two reasons.
First, as its object is in fact knowledge itself we might
expect that it would be particularly concerned about
clarifying and defining the nature of knowledge and
equally truth. Second, KM is interested not only in
academically produced knowledge but also in the every-
day, practical knowledge of managers and employees.
This forces us to consider knowledge in a wider sense
than just the output of academic research.
Within KM, it is conventional (Boisot, 1995; Davenport
& Prusak, 1998; Bell, 1999; Freeman, 2001) to draw up a
ladder from data to information to knowledge – what
Tuomi (1999) calls the knowledge hierarchy. This is
mirrored historically within information systems in the
move from data processing to information management to
KM. To give some examples, for Davenport & Prusak
(1998) data are discrete facts about the world, which in
themselves are meaningless; information is data that has
been processed or interpreted within a particular context
to inform or reduce uncertainty; while knowledge is
information that is even more valuable because of the
addition of insight, experience, context or interpretation
(Grover & Davenport, 2001). Others who use the same
basic model define knowledge in different ways. For
example, knowledge is that which enables us to assign
meaning to data (van der Spek & Spijkervet, 1997);
knowledge consists of truths, beliefs, concepts, judge-
ments and expectations (Wiig, 1993); or knowledge is
tested, validated and codified information (Earl, 1994).
Mu¨ller-Merbach (2004b) points out that one can trace a
similar distinction between knowledge and information
as far back as Plato.
Tuomi (1999) actually argues the case for a reversed
hierarchy, namely that knowledge precedes information,
which in turn precedes data. On this view, knowledge
becomes articulated within a verbal and textual context
to form an information structure. This may be embodied
as a document, a diagram, a data structure or information
system. Once this has become totally defined the ‘mean-
ing’ of the information is essentially fixed and this allows
it to be populated or instantiated with items of data that
would, by themselves, have no meaning at all. Put the
other way round, data cannot exist without a pre-defined
semantic and syntactic structure, which is information;
and information is the articulation or explication of
knowledge. Mu¨ller-Merbach (2006a) suggests informa-
tion, knowledge and opinion, where information is stored
knowledge, and opinion expresses subjective values.
Other authors have developed more complex categor-
izations of knowledge (Marshall & Sapsed, 2000). Miller
et al. (1997) concentrate on what the knowledge is about
and specify know-what, know-why, know-how, know-
who and experiential knowledge that can involve any of
the others. Blackler (1995), drawing on Collins (1993),
focuses on where the knowledge is situated and distin-
guishes between knowledge that is embrained (cogni-
tive), embodied (perceptual), encultured (social),
embedded (systematized) and encoded (formal or sym-
bolic). This has been applied empirically by Thompson &
Walsham (2004). Other classifications have been sug-
gested by, for example, Winter (1987), Fleck (1997) and
Benson & Standing (2001). Many writers (e.g., Stenmark,
2001; Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001) refer to the distinc-
tion between tacit knowledge and focal knowledge
originated by Polanyi (1958) and popularized by Nonaka
& Takeuchi (1995).
However, as has been pointed out by many commen-
tators (Swan & Scarbrough, 2001), the nature of knowl-
edge itself is highly debatable and several authors are
critical of the whole emphasis on knowledge as some
objective, commodifiable entity. Alvesson & Karreman
(2001, p. 995) argue that knowledge ‘is an ambiguous,
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unspecific and dynamic phenomenon, intrinsically re-
lated to meaning, understanding and process and there-
fore difficult to manage’. Marshall and Sapsed (200, p.12)
emphasize the ‘importance of considering knowledge not
simply as a stable and unproblematic object that can be
effectively decontextualized and freely circulated, but as a
complex, dynamic, and situated series of processes’. In
addition, they go on to argue that knowing is essentially
active – to be able to act effectively within a social
situation. Jakubik (2007) identifies four emerging views
of knowledge: the ontological view, which is concerned
with the nature and location of knowledge; the episte-
mological view, which is particularly concerned with the
production and justification of knowledge; the commod-
ity view, which sees knowledge as a resource for the
organization; and the community view, which focuses on
knowledge as a social construction.
In practice, though, the overwhelming approach with-
in KM is to take a resolutely functionalist reading of
knowledge as Schultze & Leidner’s (2002) research
showed. They classified research articles on KM between
1990 and 2000 into one of Deetz’s (1996) four discourses
of management: normative (functionalist), interpretive,
dialogic (postmodern) or critical. Of the 75 papers, 71%
were classified as normative with a further 25% being
interpretive. Schultze & Stabell (2004) look at the
contradictions involved in trying to manage tacit knowl-
edge through Burrell and Morgan’s four paradigms.
There is no space in one paper to provide a detailed
critique of all these approaches to the definition of
knowledge and information, so I shall make some general
points that will illustrate what I see as their weaknesses.
With respect to the various versions of the knowledge
hierarchy, I would argue that they all suffer from
inadequate and unclear conceptualizations of the nature
of information and its possible relationships to knowl-
edge. Mingers (1996) carried out a thorough survey of
existing theories of information, many based in some
way on Shannon & Weaver’s (1949) information theory,
including socially sophisticated models such as Mackay
(1969) and Luhmann (1990). These theories were eval-
uated in terms of four criteria: the generality of the
theory, the pragmatic usefulness for information systems,
the degree of integration with other disciplines and lastly
the correspondence with everyday usage. The approach
that was judged most successful was that of Dretske
(1981) and this formed the basis of a new theory of
information and meaning (Mingers, 1995). This theory
used Dretske’s idea of knowledge and the flow of
information but incorporated concepts from Habermas’s
(1978, 1984, 2003) theory of communicative action and
Maturana et al.’s (1995) cognitive theories embedded
within a critical realist philosophy (Mingers, 2004c).
With respect to Tuomi’s reversed hierarchy, there are
aspects of this that are valuable. Clearly, knowledge does
structure that which can be information for us, and
conditions the amount or extent of knowledge that is
available from a particular source. For instance, as Polanyi
(1958) has shown, gaining information from an X-ray
requires considerable knowledge. Equally, data does rely
on a pre-existing and consensual semantic and syntactic
structure for it to be effective as data. However, I will
argue that we need both hierarchies – data can carry
information and, in certain circumstances, this informa-
tion can then generate knowledge. At the same time a
subject’s knowledge alters the information they can
receive, and allows them to access the information in
the first place. We thus need more of an interactive view.
With regard more specifically to theories of knowledge,
there are three general problems. First, there are a large
number of papers that take a simplistic and unquestion-
ing view of knowledge as an objective commodity and
often do not even bother to define what they mean by
knowledge. Second, those authors who do recognize
different forms of knowledge point out particular and
partial sets of distinctions based on the object of knowl-
edge, the form of knowledge or the location of knowl-
edge and do not thereby do justice to the richness of ways
in which we talk of ‘knowing’. Third, and particularly
important for this paper, almost none of the literature
considers the relation of knowledge to truth.
Truth
One of the most traditional debates in philosophy has
been that of epistemology – that is the study of knowl-
edge (episteme) as opposed to mere belief or opinion
(doxa). When are we entitled to say I know something
rather than merely I believe it? We may all believe certain
states of affairs to be the case, or that we know how to do
certain things, but ultimately in order to be knowledge,
these beliefs must be testable or able to be validated in
some way; that is, there must be grounds for them to be
considered to be true.
It is interesting and perhaps indicative of the field that
there is almost no discussion at all, within the KM
literature, of the problems of truth or warrantability. The
assumption seems to be made that either knowledge is no
different from any other cognitive category such as
thought or belief, or that determining whether some-
thing is or is not knowledge is outside the scope of KM.
Even one of the founders of KM, Machlup (1980), went in
this direction. Having produced an informed discussion
of varieties of truth and truth seeking, and discussed
other aspects of the quality of knowledge such as beauty
(aesthetics) and ethicality (axiology), he declared that
such issues were largely irrelevant to his task of analysing
the production and distribution of knowledge (p. 117).
Freeman (2001), whose paper titled ‘IS Knowledge:
Foundations, Definitions and Applications’ seems to
promise some answers, defines knowledge loosely as
‘information that has been validated and is thought to be
true’ with no consideration of what being true might
mean. Von Krogh & Grand (2000) are concerned with
organizational knowledge, and in particular the way in
which new knowledge comes to be accepted or rejected
by an organization especially where it contradicts the
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existing knowledge base. Baskerville & Dulipovici (2006),
in another ‘review of the theoretical foundations’ type of
paper, can only say that ‘knowledge is a fluid mix of
framed experiences, values, contextual information, and
expert insight’, and is distinguished from information
(quoting from Wiig 1993) ‘by the addition of ‘‘truths,
beliefs, perspectives and concepts, judgements and
expectations, methodologies and know-how’’’. That
certainly covers everything then!
Tell (2004) recognizes that knowledge requires some
justification for it to be knowledge. He does not look to
theories of truth for this, but instead he looks at the
contexts within which particular knowledge claims may
be justified. He recognizes two dimensions to this:
external vs internal and procedural vs performative.
External justification relies on reference to some causal
reality external to the knowing subject while internal
justification depends on the extent to which a belief is
coherent with other beliefs and assumptions that
already exist. With procedural justification, valid knowl-
edge is generated by the extent to which a particular
procedure or methodology is followed. Classically,
scientific knowledge receives its justification from
being the result of a scientific method. In contrast,
knowledge justified by performance does not stem from
following rules and procedures but from imagination,
intuition, action and ultimately performative success.
Tell than uses these distinctions to demarcate four forms
of knowledge: objective, subjective, personal and organi-
zational.
General theories of truth
I will now summarize the main theories of truth as found
in philosophy before considering in more detail the
theories of truth coming from CR and Habermas. Note
that most theories concern the truth of propositions
about states of affairs in the world.
The most common view, in Western philosophy any-
way, is that knowledge is justified, true belief (JTB). This
stems from Plato’s Theaetetus where Socrates argues that:
When, therefore, anyone forms the true opinion of anything
without rational explanation, you may say that his mind is
truly exercised, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot
give and receive a reason for a thing, has no knowledge of
that thing; but when he adds rational explanation, then, he
is perfected in knowledge (my emphases).
Socrates was sharp enough to point out later the self-
referential difficulty of ‘knowing’ what is a rational
explanation. These three conditions have been taken
to be both necessary and sufficient for a proposition to
count as knowledge. In other words, to validly assert ‘I
know that p y’ implies:
 You must sincerely believe that p is the case.
 You must have justifiable grounds, evidence or
explanation for p.
 p must, indeed, be true.
Although this sounds clear, there are in fact many
problems with each condition as well as their conjunc-
tion. For instance, there is much debate about what
would constitute proper justification for such a belief –
empirical evidence, rational argument, personal experi-
ence, perception or what? How in any case can we
determine if something is actually true? There are a
whole range of theories of truth – correspondence,
confirmation, coherence or consensus, not to mention
sceptics (e.g. Rorty, 1989) who would deny the possibility
of truth in the first place. Indeed we might say that the
question of truth is actually the same question as that of
knowledge, so defining knowledge in terms of truth
makes little progress. There is also the Gettier problem
that provides cases where each of the conditions holds
but we would still not wish to call the result knowledge
(Gettier, 1963).
I shall briefly summarize the main philosophical
theories of truth:
 Correspondence theories (Russell, 1912; Tarski, 1944;
Popper, 1959; Wittgenstein, 1974) are the main and
most obvious view of truth. They hold that truth (and
falsity) is applied to propositions, depending on
whether the proposition corresponds to the way the
world is. It thus applies to the relationship between a
proposition and the states of affairs it describes.
Problems with this view are: (i) In what sense can a
linguistic statement be said to correspond to some-
thing quite different – an occurrence in the world? (ii)
We cannot directly access the external world so we are
only ever comparing experiences and statements with
other experiences and statements, so that we can never
actually determine if a proposition is, in fact, true.
Most other theories stem from the problems in
maintaining a correspondence theory.
 Coherence theories (Bradley, 1914; Putnam, 1981;
Quine, 1992) stress the extent to which a proposition
is consistent with other beliefs, theories and evidence
that we have. The more that it fits in with other
well-attested ideas, the more we should accept it as
true. This approach avoids the need for a direct
comparison with ‘reality’. However, it is more con-
cerned with the justification of beliefs rather than their
absolute truth. From a Kuhnian (1970) perspective,
fitting in with the current paradigm does not make the
current paradigm correct. Quine held that coherent
systems of beliefs were under-determined by empirical
data and thus that no theory could ever ultimately be
verified or falsified.
 Pragmatic theories (Peirce, 1878; James, 1976; Rorty,
1982) hold that truth is best seen in terms of how
useful or practical a theory is – that which best solves a
problem is the best theory. A version of this is
instrumentalism, which holds that a theory is simply
an instrument for making predictions, and has no
necessary connection to truth at all. This also leads
into consensus theories. An obvious argument against
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this view is that a true theory is likely to be most useful
and powerful3 and therefore should be an important
component of a useful theory.
 Consensus or discursive theories (Habermas, 1978)
accept that truth is that which results from a process
of enquiry resulting in a consensus among those most
fully informed – in the case of science, scientists. At
one level, we can see that this must be the case if we
accept with CR the impossibility of proving correspon-
dence truth. But, often today’s accepted truth is
tomorrow’s discarded theory and so this does not
guarantee truth. See the discussion below about
Habermas’s more recent views.
 Redundancy and deflationary theories (Ramsey, 1927;
Frege, 1952; Horwich, 1991) argue that the whole
concept of truth is actually redundant. If we say ‘it is
true that snow is white’ we are saying no more than
that ‘snow is white’, the two propositions will always
have the same truth-values and are therefore equiva-
lent. This seems to me largely a linguistic move as it
does not touch upon the question of how we might
know or believe that a proposition is actually the case.
 Performative theories (Strawson, 1950) also deal with
the linguistic use of the term. The suggestion here is
that by saying ‘p is true’ we are not so much
commenting on the truth of the proposition as such
but on our willingness or intention of accepting it as
true and commending it to someone else. Again, this
just seems to ignore large areas of the question of truth.
Critical realism and truth
Turning now to CR, what view of truth does it espouse?
First, how does CR relate to Hunt’s scientific realism? It is
simplest to describe it as a version of scientific realism.
Certainly Bhaskar would accept Hunt’s four propositions,
and has in fact written a book called Scientific Realism and
Human Emancipation (Bhaskar, 1986). More specific
features of CR are (Mingers, 2004b):
 A causal criterion for existence as opposed to the
perceptibility criterion of positivism. That is, we can
argue for the existence of some structure or mechanism
if it has causal effects whether or not it can be
perceived.
 A distinction between the intransitive domain of
science – objects and events that operate indepen-
dently of our perceptions of them – and the transitive
domain – the human process of generating theories,
papers, books and experimental activity.
 Distinctions between the real (all objects, mechanisms
and events), the actual (those events that do, or do not,
occur dependent on the complex interplay of struc-
tures and mechanisms) and the empirical (that subset
of events that are experienced by humans and can be
the basis for science).
 Relating to the social world, the argument that no
social theory can be purely descriptive, it must be
evaluative, and thus there can be no split between facts
and values. And, following from this, the view that
social theory is inevitably transformative, providing an
explanatory critique that logically entails action (Ar-
cher et al., 1998, Part III).
The first thing to say about truth is that the whole
approach is fallibilist as in Hunt’s principle ii). That is,
since it accepts epistemic relativity, the view that all
knowledge is ultimately historically and locally situated,
it has to accept that theories can never be proved or
known certainly to be true. Thus, if provable truth were
to be made a necessary criterion for knowledge there
could be no knowledge within CR.
Bhaskar does discuss the notion of truth and comes up
with a multivalent view involving four components or
dimensions (Bhaskar, 1994, p. 62) that could apply to a
judgment about the truth or falsity of something:
a. Normative-fiduciary: Truth as being that which is
believed from a trustworthy source – ‘trust me, I
believe it, act on it’. This sense would typically occur
within a communication where the speaker states a
proposition and the listener accepts their sincerity.
This is clearly related to Hunt’s argument about trust
and also stems ultimately from Harre´.4
b. Adequating: Based on evidence and justification rather
than mere belief – ‘there’s sound evidence for this’.
This goes beyond just the speaker’s belief to warranted
assertability but can still, of course, be false.
c. Referential-expressive: Corresponding to or at least being
adequate to some intransitive object of knowledge.
Whereas the first two dimensions are clearly in the
transitive domain and strongly tied to language, this
aspect moves beyond to posit some sort of relation
between language and a referent. It moves towards a
weak correspondence theory.
d. Ontological and alethic: This final level is the most
controversial (Groff, 2000) as it moves truth entirely
into the intransitive domain. The truth of things in
themselves, and their generative causes, rather than
the truth of propositions. It is no longer tied to
language, although it may be expressed in language.
Several comments need to be made here. First, the first
three are relatively unproblematic and quite similar to
the JTB formula, although set within a communicative
context. ‘This proposition is believable’ (B); ‘don’t just
listen to me there is some evidence for it’ (J); and ‘it fits
the facts’ (T); none of these in themselves or, indeed,
together guarantees that it is true.
Second, Bhaskar sees them as ordered or progressive.
Thus, the weakest form of truth is simply to have to
believe someone with no further justification. Better is to
3Although postmodernists argue that it is the theory that is
deemed most powerful that is accepted as true.
4Bhaskar was actually a student of Harre´ and there are still
clear resonances of this.
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have some sort of warranted assertability, some evidence
justifying the claim, although what the evidence is and
how strong it is are debatable points. Better still, there
should be some theory, description or model that can be
related to real-world structures. This obviously moves in
the direction of some sort of correspondence theory of
truth. CR does tend towards this view while accepting
inevitable limitations on it (Sayer, 2000).
Third, the ontological/alethic aspect marks a major
shift, as it no longer concerns propositions at all. It is not
predicated of a proposition but is said to be a character-
istic of the ‘real’ nature and causes of things in
themselves: ‘truth as alethic, that is, the truth of or
reason for things, people and phenomena generally
(including in science most importantly causal structures
and generative mechanisms), not propositions’ (Bhaskar,
1994, p. 64).
Habermas’s theory of truth
We can now move to consider Habermas’s theories of
knowledge and truth. His early work is known as the
theory of knowledge-constitutive interests (Habermas,
1978). This suggested that humans, as a species, had
needs for, or interest in, three particular forms of
knowledge. The technical interest in moulding nature
led to the empirical and physical sciences. For Habermas
these were underpinned by a pragmatist philosophy of
science (inspired by Peirce) and a consensus theory of
truth. The practical interest in communication and
mutual understanding led to the historical and inter-
pretive sciences underpinned by a hermeneutic criterion
of understanding. And the emancipatory interest in
self-development and authenticity led to critical
science, which identified repressions and distortions in
knowledge and in society. Its criterion of success was
the development of insight and self-expression free
from constraint. This triad drew inspiration from
Kant’s categorization of three forms of action (Mu¨ller-
Merbach, 2006b).
This theory of transcendental interests was the subject
of much criticism (see Mingers (1997) for a review), and
Habermas later transmuted it into the theory of commu-
nicative action (Habermas, 1984, 1987). Utterances and, I
would argue, actions as well raise certain validity claims
that must, if challenged, be justified. These claims are
comprehensibility, truth, rightness and truthfulness (sincer-
ity). This is premised on the argument that utterances
stand in relation to the three different ‘worlds’: the
objective or material world that consists of all actual or
possible states of affairs; the social or normative world
that consists of accepted and legitimate norms of
behaviour; and the subjective or personal world that
consists of individuals’ experiences and feelings.
When such a claim is challenged, the process of
justification must always be discursive or dialogical. That
is, there should ideally be a process of open debate
unfettered by issues of power, resources, access and so on
until agreement is reached by the ‘unforced force of the
better argument’ (Habermas, 1974, p. 240, 2003, p. 37),
what Habermas calls the ‘ideal speech situation’. Thus,
Habermas held a consensus or discursive view of truth in
the moral or normative domain of what we ought to do,
as well as in the material domain of external reality. To
say of a proposition ‘it is true’ is the same as saying of an
action, ‘it is right’, namely ideal, warranted assertability.
This links up to the realism debate discussed earlier since
a constructionist such as Gioia would clearly be com-
mitted to a consensus theory of truth without recourse to
an external world.
However, more recently Habermas (2003) has returned
to the issue of truth and now rejects his discursive theory
for propositions about the material world in favour of
one with an irreducible ontological component. In
essence, Habermas now maintains that there is a sub-
stantive difference between the moral domain of norma-
tive validity that can only ever be established through
discussion and debate within an ideal speech situation,
and the domain of propositional truth where properly
arrived at and justified agreement may still be proven
wrong by later events.
I have given up an epistemic {based only on reason and
discussion – JM} conception of truth and have sought to
distinguish more clearly between the truth of a proposition
and its rational assertability (even under approximately
ideal conditions) (Habermas, 2003, p. 8).
Habermas now accepts the basic realist view that there is
a world independent of humans, that we all experience
the same world, and that this places constraints upon us,
while still accepting that our access to this world is
inevitably conditioned or filtered through our concepts
and language. This, of course, leads to the age-old
dilemma of trying to discover some external standpoint,
outside of language and cognition, from which to judge
the truth of one’s propositions. The idea of ideal rational
discourse is not wholly wrong, but is insufficient for the
task (p. 252). While it is necessary that we come to believe
or accept the truth of propositions through a thorough
process of rational discourse, that we do so is not
sufficient to guarantee their truth. Even the most strongly
held and well-justified views may turn out to be false.
These objections have prompted me to revise the discursive
conception of rational acceptability by relating it to a
pragmatically conceived, nonepistemic concept of truth,
but without thereby assimilating ‘truth’ to ‘ideal assert-
ability’ (Habermas, 2003, p. 38) (original emphasis).
The basic outline of this nonepistemic concept of truth
has a very Popperian ring to it. If we begin with our
everyday purposeful activities within the lifeworld, we
can see that our perceptual and conceptual apparatus
unavoidably shapes our access to reality – we never
meet it naked – but at the same time our interactions,
and particularly our failures, lead us to revise our
conceptual structure. In the lifeworld, while engaged in
action, we presume and do not question the truths of the
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propositions we operate under. Only when these break
down do we move from action to discourse and offer our
beliefs up for debate and justification. Once we have
become convinced of the truth of a proposition through
the process of rational discourse we can then move back
and adopt it within the sphere of engaged action. It is
important in this process that the reasons we adduce for
coming to believe a proposition are actually related to the
experiences that have led us to question and debate.
Within the true, justified belief definition of knowledge,
the justification must stem from the actual experiential
learning that has occurred rather than being ad hoc or
coincidental as in the Gettier example above.
Habermas’s move away from an epistemic (discursive)
conception of truth is actually towards an ontological
one. When we make what we take to be true assertions we
are expressing beliefs that certain states of affairs do
actually exist, and that these in turn refer to entities or
relations that also exist. This establishes a relation
between truth and reference: between the truth of
statements and aspects of an objective world. This is so
even between different linguistic communities (spatial or
temporal) where the same referents, the same objects of
discourse, may well go under different descriptions. ‘The
experience of ‘‘coping’’ accounts for two determinations
of ‘‘objectivity’’: the fact that the way the world is is not
up to us; and the fact that it is the same for all of us’
(Habermas, 2003, p. 254).
This does not of course guarantee that the ‘knowledge’
is true – Habermas is fallibilist in the same way that
Bhaskar is:
Insofar as knowledge is justified based on a learning process
that overcomes previous errors but does not protect from
future ones, any current state of knowledge remains relative
to the best possible epistemic situation at the time
(Habermas, 2003, p. 41).
Habermas’s move is certainly welcome from a realist
position. One criticism was always that his view of
natural science was overly pragmatic or even instrumen-
tal. He tended to call it ‘empirical-analytic’ and this,
combined with the consensus theory of truth, lost touch
with a realist view of ontology. It also meant that he was
essentially anti-naturalist, seeing a radical disjunction
between natural science and social science. This shift to
some extent addresses both issues: accepting a causally
constraining reality as discussed above, and accepting a
‘weak naturalism’ (Habermas, 2003, p. 22) that there is an
underlying evolutionary continuity between the objec-
tive world and the lifeworld, between nature and culture.
However, I would argue that he does not go far enough
in this direction, and more specifically remains too
strongly wedded to the idea that validity claims, includ-
ing those of (nonepistemic) truth, are validated linguis-
tically. In the model described above, problems and
failures in the world of action lead to a switch to the
world of discourse wherein questions of truth are decided
through debate. Now while I accept that humans do
always interact within language, that is not to say that all
activity is linguistic. Within the realm of epistemological
knowledge (i.e., science), experimental activity is clearly
the cornerstone of progress. With performative knowl-
edge, the measure is successful performance whether it is
a motor skill such as riding or a social skill such as
conducting a meeting. And with experiential knowledge,
claims to have had a particular experience can be
investigated forensically, that is, through some form of
‘detective’ work. Thus, the results of activity and action
will inform the linguistic debates.5
Summary
As can be seen, truth is a highly complex and debatable
concept. I would like to pull out the following general
conclusions in leading on to consider the relations
between knowledge and truth.
The underlying conception of truth, supported by
Hunt, Bhaskar and Habermas, is a limited form of
correspondence theory. As realists, we accept the ex-
istence of an independent or intransitive domain of
objects of knowledge that have causal effect and thereby
confirm or disconfirm our knowledge. We also have to
accept, however, that we can never have pure unme-
diated access to this domain and thus that our knowledge
is always provisional and subject to change.
This places the emphasis on the degree of warrant-
ability or justification that there is for something
claiming to be knowledge. Is it a matter of believing
a trustworthy source? Seeking supporting evidence?
Witnessing a demonstration? Or conducting extensive
scientific research?
Here, some of the other theories of truth come into
play. As Habermas emphasizes, all truth claims are
ultimately validated discursively through discussion and
debate. Even when the intransitive world appears to
refute some theory, say through failed experiments, it is
the community of scientists who decide why the
experiment is failing and at what point it becomes
conclusive (Collins, 1985). Thus, there is always an
element of consensus about truth claims.
Another form of support is the extent to which a theory
is consistent with other well-attested knowledge – that is,
its coherence. But of course we have to recognize that
innovations often contradict the perceived wisdom.
Success in practice (i.e., pragmatism) also provides support
for a theory although while a true theory should be
successful it does not follow that a successful theory is true.
Forms of knowledge and truth
Much of the philosophical discussion of knowledge (an
obvious exception being Ryle 1963) confines itself to
propositional knowledge of a scientific nature. However,
as we have seen, KM is concerned with knowledge in a
wider, everyday sense. As one of the founders of KM said,
5These different varieties of knowledge will be discussed later.
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Most philosophers confine their discourses on knowledge to
verbal propositions; y In this book I use the word
knowledge in a much wider sense, because a narrow (or
‘strong’) sense of knowing would restrict its meaning
unnecessarily. If Tom, Dick and Harry say that they know
somebody or something y it is not reasonable to insist on
so restrictive a definition of knowledge that 90 percent of all
that Tom, Dick and Harry claim to know is ‘really’ not
knowledge (Machlup 1980, p. 97).
So I am concerned with the ways in which the word
‘knowledge’ or, more actively, ‘to know’ are used in
everyday speech: ‘I know her well’; ‘I know how to ride a
bike’; ‘I know there’s a train at 3.00’; ‘I know I left my key
there’; ‘I know the feeling’; ‘I know what black holes are’;
‘I know how to make a presentation’; ‘I know how the
system works’; ‘I know linear algebra’, ‘I know how to
speak Italian’. This leads us to consider whether there
may be other important forms of knowledge with
different characteristics and means of validation.
Generally, I will be talking about knowledge in the
personal sense (Polanyi, 1958), that is, in terms of an
individual and what they know, either consciously or
unconsciously. Mu¨ller-Merbach (2004a) points out the
importance of the subjective dimension of knowledge in
terms of Berkeley’s dictum that ‘to be is to be perceived’.
Knowledge also exists in an extra-personal sense as
embodied in books, papers, films, organizational practices
and procedures, the internet, etc. (World 3 in Popper’s
sense (Popper, 1972)), and indeed much of the literature in
KM concerns precisely the interaction between the two
(Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001). This can be viewed as the
dualism between action and structure in Giddens’s (1984)
structuration theory terms (Nonaka & Toyama, 2003,
2005; Zhu, 2006). In this analysis I will concentrate on the
‘action’ side of the dualism, that is, the way in which
individuals come to ‘know’ and then act in relation to this
knowledge. In taking this view I am using Giddens’s
‘methodological epoche´’ (Giddens, 1979, p. 80) to bracket
one side of the duality, the way that structural (e.g.,
organizational) knowledge is generated and reproduced, in
favour of the other side: ‘the individual ability to draw
distinctions within a collective domain of action, based on an
appreciation of context or theory, or both’ (Tsoukas &
Vladimirou, 2001, p. 979).
To discover as many different senses of the term ‘to
know’ in everyday use, I reviewed a wide range of
dictionaries. This identified 136 distinguishable uses as
shown in Table 1. Clearly, there are certain families of
resemblances here (Wittgenstein, 1958) and we will
classify them in a later section, but to begin with we
can identify certain dimensions that all usages of ‘to
know’ have in common.
First, any form of knowledge must be knowledge of
something (Bhaskar, 1978). There must always be an object
of knowledge, although by no means necessarily a material
or physical object. In the above examples, such objects
include states of affairs, people, skills, values, feelings and
emotions, social practices, organizations and complex
physical entities. Nevertheless, there must be some object
of knowledge and this connects immediately with CR.
Knowledge itself, especially as it is an individual person’s
knowledge, is always in the transitive dimension but the
objects of knowledge, even where they are concepts or
ideas, are intransitive: objects available for investigation
or debate. This transitive/intransitive distinction is not
fixed as in the internal/external world, but is always
relative to the event and context. Thus even an utterance,
which is initially in the transitive domain, becomes
intransitive after it has been uttered as it can then
become an object of knowledge: ‘Did you say that?’
‘What did you mean?’
Table 1 Senses of the term ‘to know’
No. Dictionary definition Example
1 To perceive directly, to have cognition of I know it is raining
11 To have full information of I know everything there is to know about widgets
12 To know things from information I know there is a train at 5.32
4 To recognize as the same or as familiar I know that voice
5 To be acquainted with (people) I know your mother
(organisation) I know your school
8 To have experience of I have known the cares of office
13 To be acquainted with emotions and situations I know the feeling; I know how you feel; I know how stressful an exam is
7 To have practical understanding of; to have a skill I know how to use Excel; I know how to play the piano
9 To have fixed in the mind; to learn I know my French verbs
2 To have understanding of I know how a diesel engine works
3 To recognize the nature of I know that lump is benign
6 To be aware of the truth of; to be certain of I know she is lying
10 To be able to distinguish I know right from wrong
6It is coincidental that Machlup (1980, p. 47) also identifies 13
elements of knowing – I had not read his book at the time. As
one might expect the two lists are similar but not identical.
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Second, there must always be a source of knowledge –
knowledge must come from somewhere, generally either
as a matter of logic and deduction or as some aspect of a
person’s experience. Kant (Mu¨ller-Merbach, 2007) distin-
guished these in terms of a priori knowledge, for example,
that the angles of a triangle add to 180, and a posteriori
knowledge, which is based on actual experience of the
world. Some possible sources of knowledge are direct
perception, a message or communication, reading a
timetable or book, learning as in a language, practice as
in playing the piano or plain experience over time. It is
here that the most direct connections with information
and meaning come – information can be a source of
knowledge, and existing knowledge shapes the informa-
tion that is available from a source as the example of
reading an X-ray shows.
Related to this is the third dimension – the way in
which the knowledge is stored or represented, particularly
in terms of the degree of tacitness/explicitness. Some
knowledge will be entirely conscious and explicit – we
know we know it and can express it clearly. Some
knowledge will have a degree of tacitness (Polanyi, 1958)
– we have the knowledge but are not necessarily fully
conscious of it or fully able to articulate it. For instance, we
can speak a language without knowing the rules that
govern it; or we can use a carpenter’s plane and know
when the blade needs changing. Finally, much of our
knowledge, especially at a perceptual/motor level but also
at higher levels as well (Mingers, 2001b), is embodied at a
pre-conscious level. It governs or shapes what we can be
conscious of (Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Varela et al., 1991).
Fourthly, as we have already discussed, one very
important facet of knowledge is its truth or warrantability.
This is supposedly what distinguishes knowledge from
simply belief or opinion. However, the nature of truth is a
very complex question and differs between different forms
of knowledge, so I shall discuss this in the next section.
This has led me to distinguish four generic forms of
knowledge that differ in terms of the above four
characteristics and yet account for the 13 usages
identified in Table 1. These are summarized in Table 2.
Everyday propositional knowledge
This form of knowledge is our everyday, commonsense,
relatively direct awareness of the world around us. To
know in this sense is to know that – to be aware of or to be
cognizant of states of affairs. It is to know that it is
raining, that there is someone at the door, that there is a
train at 12.15, that there are 35 widgets in stock or that
the petrol tank is half-full. I call it propositional know-
ledge, in comparison with the other forms, because it is
generally explicit and conscious, and can be represented
in the form of propositional statements: ‘I know that x is
or was the case’ (Klein, 1971).
We gain propositional knowledge from several sources.
This first is our direct perception of the world, through
any of the senses. In philosophy, this kind of direct
knowledge of things is called de re as opposed to that
which we are told about – de dicto. In fact, Dretske, whose
work we drew on earlier, actually restricts his theory of
knowledge to only this kind of direct perceptual know-
ledge generated by the receipt of signs carrying informa-
tion. But I shall include more generally knowledge of
states of affairs that we are told about through a linguistic
(or indeed non-verbal) communication, and knowledge
we get through books, papers, timetables and so on.
Table 2 Forms of knowledge and truth
Type of knowledge Object of knowledge Source of knowledge Form of representation Criteria for validity
Propositional
I know it is raining
I know there is a train at 3.00
I know there is someone at
the door
States of affairs in the
physical and social
world.
To know that x
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I know I left my key there
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I know how to ride
I know how to read an X-Ray
I know how to present
Skills, abilities and
competences







I know what black holes are
I know linear algebra
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and events.
To know why x
Formal methods of










Management knowledge and knowledge management John Mingers 71
Knowledge Management Research & Practice
In terms of its warrantability, propositional knowledge
is referential-expressive in Bhaskar’s terms and concerns the
validity claim of truth in Habermas’s communication
theory, or non-epistemic truth in his later work. Here we
can go beyond belief and even justification towards
confirming a relation between the proposition and the
intransitive world to which it refers.
Indeed, if we follow Dretske (1981) and Mingers (1995)
we can see a direct causal relation between information
and the propositional knowledge that it creates. Dretske
argues that the meaning that is generated from the
information we receive leads us to have certain beliefs
about the world. Now, beliefs as such are not identical to
knowledge as is shown by the justified, true belief formula
mentioned above. We may genuinely believe something
but it may in fact be false even though there is justification
for it, for example, the belief that the sun orbits the earth.
Or, we may believe something that is in fact true but for
the wrong reasons, for example, we may think it is 10.00
AM (and it is) because the clock says so although the clock
has in fact stopped. In neither case would we be entitled to
say ‘we know thaty’. However, beliefs caused by informa-
tion must be true since for Dretske information must be
true to be information. Thus, if the clock were working
correctly we could say we know it is 10.00 because our
belief is caused by (true) information.
Even so, we cannot finally prove our knowledge is true
for we might be mistaken either in our interpretation
of the sign (misreading the clock) or in believing it was
(true) information when in fact it was not (the clock was
stopped).
Experiential knowledge
We talk about knowing in this sense when we are
referring to our own individual previous experience,
particularly of people, places, events or feelings. To know
in this sense is to be acquainted with or to be familiar
with. Thus, I know Mary Scott, I know Birmingham, I
know ‘that feeling’, I don’t know your school, or I know
how bad toothache can be.
Knowing in this sense is a statement about the
experience that someone has had, or not had, in the
past. The depth of knowledge concerned is very variable –
in saying ‘I know Mary Scott’ I might just mean I know
who she is, or I might mean that I know her very well.
This form of knowledge is not primarily propositional.
We can always make a propositional statement about it –
‘It is true that I know Mary Scott’ but this is a second-level
statement the object of which is our first-level experi-
ential knowledge. We do not say ‘I know that Mary Scott.’
Knowledge in this sense can be much richer and deeper
than simple propositional knowledge. To know someone
is not simply to know that they exist; it is to have a
complex set of understandings, experiences, feeling and
beliefs about that person. Much of this may be tacit and
difficult to express explicitly. It is also deeply personal or
subjective since my experience of a person or place may
be very different from someone else’s.
The validity of this form of knowledge must ultimately
come down to a matter of Habermas’s truthfulness or
sincerity (normative-fiduciary in Bhaskar’s terms) since it
concerns a particular person’s experiences or feelings. Of
course, one does not just have to accept a person’s
discursive justification, one might try to discover or
provide some sort of evidence or justification as well which
could include documentary evidence – letters, photos,
transcripts, etc. or corroboration from other people.
Performative knowledge
Performative knowledge involves having some skill or
competence in order to be able to do something – it is to
know how rather than to know or to know that (Polanyi,
1958; Ryle, 1963). I include in this category much more
than simple physical skills. So, we can talk of knowing
how to ride a bike, knowing how to play the piano,
knowing how to speak a language, knowing how to ‘play
the game’ as in office politics or a sport, knowing how to
parent, or knowing how to cook.
What distinguishes this type of knowledge is that it
goes beyond simple experience of something to involve
particular skills and abilities that have to be learnt over a
period of time. It generally involves explicit training in
order to develop the necessary skills. I call it performative
because it usually involves some kind of physical motor
skills, some kind of performance – it goes beyond
knowledge in a purely conceptual sense. For example,
one could know plenty of the theory of music without
being able to play the piano, and in its turn playing the
piano does not mean that you can play the violin. Each
skill has to be learnt over time and through practice – it is
inscriptive rather than intellective (Hayles, 1992).
This in turn means that performative knowledge is
inherently embodied (Varela et al., 1991; Mingers, 2001b)
– that is, it exists as dispositions or connective states of
the body and nervous system itself and may well be pre-
conscious. Even higher level skills such as language
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Merleau-Ponty, 1969; Lakoff &
Johnson, 1987) or cognitive/mathematical activities such
as navigation (Hutchins, 1995) have significant bodily
aspects. I once observed, at an airport, an English girl
talking to her English friend. Their conversation was
typically quiet and low-key. She then struck up a
conversation with an Italian woman and it turned
out she was herself half Italian and could speak Italian.
Her whole manner and disposition changed instantly,
becoming louder, more emotional and much more
animated as she unconsciously switched from being
English to being Italian.
Generally, experiential knowledge is evaluated in terms
of practical success or failure rather than truth. Can one
actually ride the bike, play the piano or converse in
Italian? Although of course, there will be degrees of
ability in many of these activities. Dreyfus (1992)
presents a useful analysis from a phenomenological
viewpoint of the development of skills from novice to
expert. In some ways, this is actually quite close to
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Bhaskar’s concept of alethic truth that I critiqued
above. To demonstrate that one is a pianist by actually
performing validates itself without need of propositions
or assertions. We can also bring in here Habermas’s
validity claim of comprehensibility. Before a speech act or
indeed any other social action can be judged, it must be
understood, that, it must be performed in a competent
manner. Habermas draws on Chomsky’s (1957) notion
of a competent speaker of a language (Habermas, 1979,
p. 29), but this can be enlarged to cover all the aspects
of performative knowledge.
Epistemological knowledge
By epistemological knowledge, I am signalling a move
away from the everyday knowing that things are the case
towards deeper understandings of why things are as they
are. It is to know why, to be knowledgeable about, to
know the truth of, to be certain of, or to understand. It
can be seen as related to or a development of everyday
propositional knowledge and I would include within this
category what we call scientific knowledge – very much
the subject of CR. I have called it epistemological
knowledge to indicate that it is the most self-conscious
about its validity and, more than the other forms of
knowledge, is centrally characterized by its concern for
truth. It should not be confused with Habermas’s
epistemic (discursive) approach.
This form of knowledge goes beneath the surface of
what appears to be the case, the domain of the empirical,
to be able to account for the empirical in terms of
underlying reasons or causes. I would not want this to be
seen in terms of some simple-minded, linear model of
cause and effect. Examples here are to know how a diesel
engine works, to know why inflation is falling, to know
the difference between right and wrong, or to know
‘What Freud Really Said’ to quote a well-known book.
This type of knowledge is in some ways the obverse of
performative knowledge as it is almost entirely explicit
and discursive and is judged in terms of its correctness
rather than its success. It can be knowledge of an
everyday kind – knowing how something works, but in
the main it refers to scholarly knowledge that is
generated according to well-defined procedures or meth-
odologies. However, I do not only include knowledge of
material things. Of equal importance (Habermas, 1984,
1990) is knowledge of the social world and the personal
world. In the social world we are interested in explaining
why certain norms or patterns of behaviour exist and are
maintained, and perhaps why others are not. In the
personal world we want to gain both valid interpretations
of others and undistorted understanding of one’s self
(Sayer, 2000).
I should like to end with one final comment. The paper
has been concerned with analysing several different forms
or types of knowledge, but of course in real-world
situations and activities these different types will typically
be involved together and will interact with each other. To
take just one example, suppose you are chairing a meeting.
This will draw on propositional knowledge about parti-
cular facts and states of affairs; experiential knowledge of
people, events, and practices; performative knowledge,
perhaps of body language and physical gestures; and
epistemological knowledge, perhaps of economics or a
particular industrial process.
Conclusions
The contributions of this paper have been primarily
theoretical.
The first is to recognize the multidimensional nature of
what we can know. Most KM literature implicitly assumes
that knowledge is an integral, easily definable, commodity
that can be extracted, stored and transmitted relatively
easily. The literature that does not presumes it to be some
form of processed information, categorizes it on a single
dimension such as tacit/explicit or argues that it is too
complex to manage at all. In contrast, this paper has
proposed a polyvalent view of knowledge that recognizes
four distinctively different forms of knowledge – proposi-
tional, experiential, performative and epistemological –
based on several different dimensions. It is argued that this
typology does justice to the rich and varied ways in which
people may be said ‘to know’ something.
The second is to point out the intimate connection
between knowledge and truth, which is rarely discussed
in the KM literature. Knowledge, to be knowledge rather
than simply opinion, raises claims as to its truth or
validity. Truth, too, turns out to be a complex concept
and within the paper it has been explored from a critical
realist perspective. This grounds its concept of truth in
terms of correspondence to an external, independent
reality but recognizes that epistemologically knowledge is
always provisional and relative. If truth can never be
known with certainty, then great emphasis must be
paid to questions of justification and warrantability.
What would lead us to accept a knowledge claim –
accepting the trustworthiness of the source; witnessing
an event; gathering evidence; or its consistency with
our other beliefs?
This leads to the view that the different forms of
knowledge imply different forms of truth or, rather,
different ways of justifying their claim to truth. Proposi-
tional knowledge of day-to-day states of affairs can be
directly justified in terms of the (true) information that
generates it. Performative knowledge can be justified by a
successful performance. Experiential knowledge can be
justified through the sincerity of the claimant or the
discovery of adequate evidence, while epistemological
knowledge brings in the full force of science, whether it
be natural or social.
Before moving on to some practical implications, I
would like to make it clear that although this paper has
concentrated on the subjective aspects of knowledge, the
knowing subject, and has primarily developed somewhat
static categorizations, I see this as only part of a much
broader domain that is both processual and social. In
terms of process, events in the world carry information
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and lead to experiences that generate meaning, ideas and
knowledge for individuals. At the same time, as Tuomi
(1999) indicated, our knowledge, and more generally our
cognitive structure, conditions both how we experience
events and what information is available to us from
them. This dynamic interactive process involves the
material world, but even more significantly the social
world. As individuals, we exist in multiple social net-
works or forms of life (Wittgenstein, 1958) and much of
our everyday knowledge is actually intersubjectively
shared knowledge about acting effectively within these
social systems.
In terms of the practice of KM, I would draw two
general conclusions. First, there is the sheer richness and
variety of forms of knowledge and, significantly, the fact
that in real situations they all interact together. This
means that, except for fairly well-defined domains where
knowledge can be easily codified and represented,
managing knowledge is vastly different from managing
information and requires sophisticated and people-
intensive activities that can only be mediated or
facilitated by information and communication technol-
ogies. It is interesting to realize that the major form of
institutionalized KM is actually education. Here we have
a massively complex and highly resourced system
devoted entirely to generating knowledge, capturing
and storing knowledge, instilling it into pupils and
students over many years, and finally testing and
certifying their capabilities and competencies. This gives
some idea of the difficulty of the task, and should make
us wary of those who peddle quick-fix KM systems to
unwary organizations.
Second, stemming from considerations of truth is the
importance of the whole process of validating and
warranting knowledge claims in order to ensure that we
are working with genuine ‘knowledge’ rather than simply
unsubstantiated belief or unwarranted contentions. In
February 2004, Google (Caslon Analytics, 2004) esti-
mated that it now covered 4.3 billion pages of informa-
tion on the internet. Certainly, you can search for any
topic imaginable and almost certainly discover many
pages devoted to that subject. So, there is no shortage of
putative knowledge but the question becomes how
reliable is any of it? Is a particular page the polemical
beliefs of someone with extreme views? Is it well meaning
but unsubstantiated suppositions? Is it reasonably well-
accepted commonsense advice? Or, is it substantive
theoretical conclusions based on peer-reviewed research?
Internet sites need certificates of validity in the same way
that they have certificates of safety.
The importance of reliability and trust can also be
exemplified with the operation of the e-Bay auction site.
One of the strongest features of this is the feedback process
that occurs after every transaction. Both buyer and seller
are expected to complete feedback on each other detailing
how happy they were with the transaction. This feedback
then becomes publicly available as a record of the
trustworthiness of each person. Once built up, reputations
become very important, especially for sellers, and have a
very strong effect in ensuring good behaviour all round.
Knowledge is certainly a vital resource in today’s world,
but we must recognize its complex nature if we hope to
make use of it more successfully in our institutions and
organizations.
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